Suning’s single most consequential financial decision arrived in December 2017. Just eighteen months into its ownership, Inter issued a €300m senior secured bond through Inter Media & Communication, the SPV originally established during Erick Thohir’s tenure in 2014. The five-year note carried a 4.875% coupon and matured in December 2022.
The mechanics of the structure were critical. Rather than borrowing directly at club level, Inter securitised future media and sponsorship revenues through the SPV. The vehicle pledged the club’s broadcasting income, commercial contracts, archive rights, and intellectual property as collateral to bondholders. In effect, Inter sold a portion of its future cash flows to the credit markets in exchange for immediate liquidity.
The structure was not unique to Inter. Real Madrid also utilised forms of securitised financing with its 2019 Bernabéu refurbishment bond. The 2014 creation of the SPV had been the prototype: a one-off accounting transaction generating a disposal gain. The 2017 bond represented the industrialised version of that concept, transforming future operating revenues into a recurring source of structural credit financing.
The implications extended beyond simple refinancing. From that point onward, Inter’s future media and sponsorship income became contractually subordinated to bondholders. Before operational cash could flow into the football business, coupon obligations had to be serviced. Bondholders effectively sat ahead of the club itself in the revenue waterfall.
The proceeds of the issuance served two primary purposes. First, to refinance existing liabilities; second, to provide additional working capital flexibility. Importantly, the bond did not directly finance player acquisitions or transfer spending. The football operation itself continued to rely on shareholder support, transfer instalments, and expanding wage commitments. What the bond achieved was something different: it converted part of Inter’s volatile and seasonally dependent revenue base into predictable upfront liquidity.
This came at a cost.
The original 4.875% coupon appeared relatively attractive at issuance for a sub-investment-grade football asset, implying annual interest payments of approximately €15m. Yet this burden sat on top of Inter’s broader financing costs. By 2017/18, the club’s total net interest expense had already climbed toward €35m, equivalent to roughly 10% of annual revenue.
Still, from Suning’s perspective, debt financing remained materially cheaper than continued equity injections. Equity capital requires ownership dilution or permanent shareholder funding. Debt, by contrast, offered immediate liquidity while preserving control. The trade-off, however, was structural: the cost of future failure was transferred onto the club’s future revenue streams.
A further benefit of bond financing lies in its flexibility. The COVID-19 period provides the evidence. Full stadiums and supporters are the pinnacle of the football industry, they’re the heart and soul of the game. Aside from the vital support that they provide their beloved team, they provide their clubs with a substantial source of revenue. Empty stadiums therefore represented not merely an aesthetic loss, but a direct collapse in matchday revenue. During the 2020/21 season, Inter generated effectively no matchday revenue, missing approximately €45m of expected income. To preserve liquidity during the pandemic, the club added a further €75m tap to the existing bond programme in 2020, increasing the outstanding balance to roughly €375m. The interest burden rose accordingly. By 2021/22, Inter’s net interest payable peaked at approximately €48m, equivalent to around 12% of annual revenue.
By early 2022, the original 2017 notes were approaching maturity, while Suning itself was facing mounting financial pressure in China. Refinancing became unavoidable.
The Refinancing Trap
In February 2022, Inter Media & Communication issued a new €415m senior secured bond maturing in 2027, this time carrying a significantly higher 6.75% coupon. The increase of nearly 190 basis points in just over four years reflected both the broader global credit environment and Inter-specific deterioration. Rating agencies had downgraded the structure, operating losses had accumulated, and the lingering effects of the pandemic remained visible throughout the club’s financial statements.
The refinancing crystallised the true cost of the leverage cycle. Annual coupon payments on the bond alone now approached €28m, excluding shareholder loans, bank facilities, and other financing costs.
The structural consequences became increasingly visible. By 2023/24, Inter’s net interest expense stood at approximately €35m, the highest in Serie A by a considerable margin. Juventus paid around €20m in net interest. Roma paid approximately €11m. AC Milan, operating under a far lighter post-Elliott capital structure, paid less than €1m.
Net financial debt, after netting cash balances against gross borrowings, also remained the highest in Italy at roughly €311m. Every euro of operating profit Inter generated first had to clear the financing structure before creating value for equity holders.
At this stage, the debt burden increasingly began influencing sporting strategy itself. Initially, the bond programme had functioned as a liquidity enhancer and working capital stabiliser. Over time, however, it evolved into a structural constraint on football operations.
The transfer market illustrates this transition clearly. Between 2018/19 and 2021/22, Inter recorded cumulative net transfer spending of approximately €271m. Across the following three seasons, however, the club generated a cumulative positive transfer balance of roughly €56m. Inter transitioned from aggressive buyer to forced seller.
The era of expansive investment that had characterised the late Suning period gradually gave way to an era defined by player disposals, wage reductions, and liquidity management.
This is what financial engineering looks like in practice. Inter did not stop spending on football; it increasingly stopped spending its own money on football.
Between 2017 and 2024, the bond programme financed multiple refinancing cycles, supported squad rebuilds, and sustained operational liquidity. Yet it also embedded a recurring interest burden that quietly shaped the limits of Inter’s sporting ambition. The interest line on the income statement increasingly became one of the most important determinants of what the club could afford on the pitch.
The cash flow statements illustrate the dynamic clearly.
Between 2018/19 and 2023/24, Inter generated the following operational cash flow before interest and taxes. Yet after accounting for interest and taxes, the remaining cash flow was materially weaker:
Cleats & Cashflows
A table showing the development of Inter’s operating cash flow before/ after interest & tax (€m)
Cleats & Cashflows
Figure 6: A graph showing the development of Inter’s operating cash flow, cash flow after working capital, free cash flow and interest paid (as indicated in cash flow statement).
The resolution of the bond cycle arrived only after Oaktree assumed control of the club. In 2025, Inter refinanced the 2027 notes early through a new issuance carrying a significantly lower 4.52% coupon and maturing in 2030. The refinancing reportedly reduced annual interest costs by approximately €12m.
The credit markets effectively priced the entire governance cycle in three transactions:
- 4.875% in 2017, when Suning’s ownership story still carried optimism
- 6.75% in 2022, when leverage and operational fragility had become visible
- 4.52% in 2025, after Oaktree’s takeover restored creditor confidence
The bond market priced the governance transition before the football world had registered it.
Inter’s golden cycle was not financed through sustainable operating profitability. It was financed through leverage, securitisation, and the monetisation of future cash flows.
Inter did not finance success from operations. It financed success by selling tomorrow.
But by 2022, the bond programme alone could no longer hold the structure together. The next chapter is how it broke.