Bangladesh’s finance and planning minister has signalled a shift towards international capital markets to reduce reliance on financing from the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank. He has spoken of cancelling the existing IMF programme the government inherited and issuing sovereign bonds. An Alternative Financing Committee is examining the options.
Diversifying financing sources is a sensible objective. Access to international capital markets can provide greater flexibility, broaden the investor base, and establish a sovereign borrowing track record. But commercial creditors impose their own discipline. They demand compensation for sovereign risk, scrutinise fiscal and external vulnerabilities, and can withhold new financing precisely when a country needs it most.
Ironically, accessing international bond markets on affordable terms may depend on guarantees from the very multilateral institutions Bangladesh seeks to move beyond. The central question is how much commercial borrowing can realistically provide, at what cost and maturity, and under what conditions.
The financing arithmetic
Options include renminbi-denominated Panda bonds issued in mainland China, offshore renminbi-denominated Dim Sum bonds, yen-denominated Samurai bonds issued in Japan, Islamic Sukuk, and international Eurobonds. Commercial sovereign bonds commonly carry maturities of three to 10 years, although longer tenors are possible. For a speculative-grade borrower, securing longer maturities at affordable rates is difficult.
Lower interest rates in Japan and China make yen- and renminbi-denominated bonds appear cheaper than dollar-denominated Sukuk and Eurobonds. But Bangladesh’s credit rating would attract a substantial risk premium, while currency hedging costs could offset the apparent interest-rate savings.
The relevant measure is the all-in borrowing cost, including interest, issue expenses, guarantee fees, and currency hedging costs. Without hedging, foreign-currency bonds expose Bangladesh to exchange-rate movements that could substantially increase debt-servicing obligations.
Recent issuances illustrate the variation in borrowing costs. Indonesia’s Panda and Dim Sum bonds in 2025-26 carried coupons of roughly 2-3%. Pakistan, a closer credit comparator, issued dollar Eurobonds in 2026 at around 7.5-8%. These differences reflect creditworthiness, currencies, maturities and financing structures, rather than directly comparable all-in borrowing costs.
Bangladesh’s own experience offers a useful benchmark. In 2019, AAA-rated IFC issued a three-year taka-denominated Bangla Bond in London at around 6%, while PRAN, the ultimate borrower, paid about 9.5%. Although PRAN faced no direct exchange-rate risk, its borrowing cost was substantial. Bangladesh would face higher borrowing costs than AAA-rated IFC, reflecting its weaker credit standing.
Commercial bonds offer greater policy autonomy. They do not generally require specific reforms in utility pricing, state-owned enterprises or fiscal management. Governments also have more freedom over how they spend the proceeds, except when bonds are issued for specified purposes, and establish an international pricing benchmark for Bangladeshi corporations.
Multilateral financing offers a different cost structure. IDA blend credits carry interest rates of around 2%, with maturities of about 25 years, including five-year grace periods. ADB’s concessional loans offer broadly similar terms, although its regular lending is market-linked. Lower rates and longer repayment periods substantially reduce debt-servicing and refinancing pressures.
But they entail negotiations, documentation and oversight. World Bank and ADB project loans impose procurement and safeguard requirements, while policy-based financing involves agreed reforms. IMF programmes carry macroeconomic targets and structural benchmarks. These requirements consume administrative resources and limit policy discretion.
The limits of market access
Can international bond markets make a meaningful contribution to Bangladesh’s financing needs? External loan disbursements declined from about $9.5 billion in FY2023-24 to $7.5 billion in FY2025-26. Even against this reduced flow, how much could Bangladesh realistically raise through sovereign bonds, and at what cost?
The Bangla Bond experience illustrates the difficulty of sustaining market access. Despite a successful launch, it did not develop into a regular programme of international taka-denominated bond issuance. Initial investor interest does not necessarily translate into a dependable source of financing.
Annual Panda bond issuance was approximately $25-30 billion in 2024-25, although the market expanded rapidly in 2026. At the earlier market size, raising $2-3 billion would have represented roughly a tenth of annual issuance. Securing such financing would be a substantial undertaking for a new sovereign borrower, particularly in a market dominated by established, highly rated issuers.
Securing guarantees at this scale is far from straightforward. The World Bank Group issued more than $25 billion in guarantees in FY26, covering a range of investments and financing arrangements rather than sovereign bonds alone. Pakistan’s inaugural Panda bond in 2026, backed by ADB and AIIB guarantees, raised about $260 million. These illustrate both the potential of guarantees and the difficulty of mobilising several billion dollars annually through guaranteed sovereign bonds. Paradoxically, commercial borrowing may require continued reliance on multilateral institutions.
Multilateral guarantees cannot substitute indefinitely for stronger creditworthiness. Investors and rating agencies assess fiscal performance, debt sustainability, external vulnerabilities, and the credibility of economic policies, drawing partly on IMF assessments. Ending an IMF programme without a convincing alternative policy framework could undermine investor confidence. Ultimately, affordable market access depends on stronger tax revenues, a healthier banking sector, better management of state-owned enterprises, and adequate foreign-exchange reserves.
Sovereign bonds come with refinancing risks. The principal often falls due in a single large payment. Governments may expect to repay maturing bonds by issuing new ones, but that option can disappear when investor confidence weakens. Sri Lanka, Ghana and Zambia illustrate how fiscal and external vulnerabilities, compounded by restricted market access, can culminate in debt distress and default. Their circumstances differed, but the lesson is common: borrowing from international markets is easier than ensuring continued access when debts mature.
Multilateral development loans are generally better suited to long-gestation infrastructure projects. Their extended repayment schedules allow more time for economic benefits to materialise. Financing such projects with shorter-maturity bonds creates repayment obligations well before those benefits emerge.
The policy trade-off
Sovereign bonds offer greater flexibility and fewer policy conditions, but at the price of higher borrowing costs and greater refinancing risks. Whether that trade-off is worthwhile depends on the terms Bangladesh can secure.
The Alternative Financing Committee should assess investor appetite and borrowing costs before considering a modest initial issue. A small offering could help establish a presence in international bond markets without taking on excessive commitments. Developing a reliable benchmark requires regular issuance, transparent disclosure, and an active investor base.
That comes from financial strength. Bangladesh still needs stronger public finances, a healthier banking system, reliable energy supply and credible macroeconomic policies. The measure of success is not how much Bangladesh can borrow from global bond markets, but whether doing so improves the country’s long-term financing position.