With the yield on 30-year US government debt at its highest since 2002, an obvious question to ask is why the stock market is so relaxed. The cost of borrowing is back where it was before the financial crisis, bonds offer investors a viable alternative source of income again, and the present-day value of future earnings is being squeezed. Why then are shares close to their all-time high?
The obvious answer is that earnings continue to rise. We have had quarter after quarter of robust profits growth. Maybe that is reason enough. But even a cursory glance at history suggests that soaring bond yields can be the trigger for a stock market correction. The question remains: how high is too high for bond yields?
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Bond yields impact the stock market in two ways. First, through valuations, and then through profits. This explains why there is no absolute bond yield that ‘breaks’ the equity market. What matters first is when the return available on bonds makes the effective earnings ‘return’ on shares unattractive; and next when higher rates start to damage those earnings.
My working life has been dominated by falling bond yields. Whatever the problem, the answer has been lower interest rates. The cost of capital fell for forty years, creating the fragile economic world we inhabit today – a world of unsustainable debt, sky-high property prices and inter-generational tension.
But it was not a straight-line reduction. There has been a handful of sharp reversals in which the cost of money rose sharply. It is interesting to see how stock markets responded to those. It may tell us something about what lies ahead.
The period leading up to the stock market crash of 1987 is the first interesting parallel. Share prices had risen strongly – the US market was up more than 40% in the first seven months of the year. At the same time, bond yields were also moving sharply higher. From January to August 1987, the earnings yield (earnings divided by price – which falls as shares rise, just like a bond yield) dropped from 5.6% to 4.7% as prices rose faster than profits. At the same time, bond yields increased from 7.1% to 8.8% and then again to 9.4% in September.
Then, as now, rising yields were in part a reflection of economic strength. The problem, neither before nor after the crash, was weak earnings. It was the increasingly uncomfortable gap between the yields on bonds and equities. That left an expensive stock market vulnerable to other forces, especially the new, untested phenomenon of program trading.
A second parallel, which may be relevant today, is 1994, when the Fed tightened interest rates aggressively and bond yields followed suit. The 10-year Treasury bond yield rose from 5.75% to almost 8%, but so too did the earnings yield as profits grew. Bond yields subsequently fell sharply in 1995, setting the scene for the explosive growth in share prices that led Alan Greenspan to question whether the market had become irrationally exuberant.
It was not. The stock market rally was a sensible response to rising profits and a fall in the cost of borrowing from 8% all the way back down to 5.5% again. By the start of 1996 the earnings yield on shares and the yield on bonds were back in line. The pressure that rising bond yields had put on equity valuations had disappeared.
The best example of rising bond yields exposing an absurd equity market valuation came three years later when things really did get exuberant. By the summer of 1999, the earnings yield on shares had fallen to just 3% and the bond yield was rising from under 5% to nearly 7%. Investors were accepting less than half the yield on a risk-free government bond despite the risk of owning a share. Only heroic assumptions about future earnings growth could make that work.
A year after the bursting of the dot.com bubble, things got more interesting because the valuation problem then morphed into an earnings crisis. According to the Shiller database (from which all these calculations are derived), corporate earnings in the US more than halved from $54 a share in September 2000 to $25 in December 2001. The earnings yield fell further despite the drop in share prices. First valuations, then earnings.
The last example worth looking at is the financial crisis. At the peak of the market in October 2007, shares were not obviously expensive. They were yielding more than bonds (6% versus 4.5%). But earnings subsequently collapsed in 2008-9 as financial sector profits evaporated and recession hit.
By the end of 2009, the earnings yield was just 1% despite the collapse in share prices. By then investors were looking through the wreckage to an earnings recovery. But that just makes the point that the apparently attractive earnings yield in 2007 told us nothing about what lay around the corner. The apparent equity valuation was an illusion because the earnings underpinning it disappeared.
Which brings us to today, and whether or not a 10-year Treasury yield of 5.3% makes shares, on a similar earnings yield, expensive. Bond yields above 5% have certainly brought the TINA era (there is no alternative) to an end. Bonds are once again a plausible alternative to equities. But shares are not obviously expensive relative to bonds in the way they were in 2000, provided earnings continue to deliver.
The answer to ‘how high is too high’ is not a single number. The danger comes when bond yields rise faster than earnings can justify equity valuations, as in 1987 and 2000, or when high yields cause earnings themselves to turn down through higher refinancing costs, more expensive mortgages, weaker consumption, lower investment and squeezed profit margins.
We are not there yet. Perhaps today’s strong economy and the AI investment boom can absorb a higher cost of capital, as in 1994. Less reassuring is the possibility that the earnings growth which has protected the market so far starts to crack. As Deep Throat didn’t quite say: follow the earnings.
This article was originally published in The Telegraph.
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